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A long-running difficulty with conventional game theory has been how to modify it to accom-
modate the bounded rationality of all real-world players. A recurring issue in statistical physics
is how best to approximate joint probability distributions with decoupled (and therefore far more
tractable) distributions. This paper shows that the same information theoretic mathematical struc-
ture, known as Product Distribution (PD) theory, addresses both issues. In this, PD theory not
only provides a principled formulation of bounded rationality and a set of new types of mean field
theory in statistical physics. It also shows that those topics are fundamentally one and the same.
PACS numbers: 89.20.-a, 89.75.-k , 89.75.Fb
I. INTRODUCTION
In noncooperative game theory, one has a set of N
players, each choosing its strategy xi independently, by
sampling a distribution qi(xi) over those strategies. Each
player i also has her own utility function gi(x), specify-
ing how much reward she gets for every possible joint-
strategy x of all N players. Let q(i)(x(i)) mean the joint
probability distribution of all players other than i, i.e.,∏
j 6=i qj(xj). Then the “goal” of each player i is to set qi
to so that, conditioned on q(i), the expected value of i’s
utility is as high as possible.
Conventional game theory assumes each player i is
“fully rational”, able to solve for that optimal qi, and
that she then uses that distribution. It is primar-
ily concerned with analyzing the such equilibria of the
game [3, 4, 5, 6]. In the real world, this assump-
tion of full rationality almost never holds, whether the
players are humans, animals, or computational agents
[7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15]. This is due to the cost of
computation of that optimal distribution, if nothing else.
This real-world bounded rationality is one of the ma-
jor impediments to applying conventional game theory in
the real world.
This paper shows how Shannon’s information theory
[16, 17, 18] provides a principled way to modify con-
ventional game theory to accommodate bounded ratio-
nality. This is done by following information theory’s
prescription that, given only partial knowledge concern-
ing the distributions the players are using, we should use
the Maximum Entropy (Maxent) principle to infer those
distributions. Doing so results in the principle that the
bounded rational equilibrium is the minimizer of a cer-
tain set of coupled Lagrangian functions of the joint dis-
tribution, q(x) =
∏
i qi(xi). This mathematical structure
is a special instance of Product Distribution (PD) theory
[11, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23].
In addition to showing how to formulate bounded ra-
tionality, PD theory provides many other advantages to
game theory. Its formulation of bounded rationality ex-
plicitly includes a term that, in light of information the-
ory, is naturally interpreted as a cost of computation.
PD theory also seamlessly accommodates multiple util-
ity functions per player. It also provides many powerful
techniques for finding (bounded rational) equilibria, and
helps address the issue of multiple equilibria. Another
advantage is that by changing the coordinates of the un-
derlying space of joint moves x, the same mathematics
describes a type of bounded rational cooperative game
theory, in which the moves of the players are transformed
into contracts they all offer one another.
Perhaps the most succinct and principled way of deriv-
ing statistical physics is as the application of the Maxent
principle. In this formulation, the problem of statistical
physics is cast as how best to infer the probability dis-
tribution over a system’s states when one’s prior knowl-
edge consists purely of the expectation values of certain
functions of the system’s state [18, 24]. For example,
this prescription says we should infer that the probabil-
ity distribution p governing the system is the Boltzmann
distribution when our prior knowledge is the system’s
expected energy. This is known as the “canonical en-
semble”. Other ensembles arise when other expectation
values are added to one’s prior knowledge. In particu-
lar, if the number of particles in the system is uncertain,
but one knows its expectation value, one arrives at the
“grand canonical ensemble”.
One major difficulty with working with these ensem-
bles is that under them the particles of the system are sta-
tistically coupled with one another. For high-dimensional
systems, this can make statistical physics calculations
very difficult. Accordingly, a large body of work has been
produced under the rubric of Mean Field (MF) theory, in
which the ensemble is approximated with a distribution
in which the particles are independent [25]. In an MF ap-
proximation, a product distribution q governs the joint
state of the particles — just as a product distribution
governs the joint strategy of the players in a game.
MF approximations are usually derived in an ad hoc
manner. The principled way to derive a MF approxima-
2tion (or any other kind) to a particular ensemble is to
specify a distance measure saying how close two prob-
ability distributions are, and then solve for the q that
is closest to the distribution being approximated, p. To
do this one needs to specify the distance measure. How
best to measure distances between probability distribu-
tions is a topic of ongoing controversy and research [26].
The most common way to do so is with the infinite limit
log likelihood of data being generated by one distribution
but misattributed to have come from the other. This is
known as the Kullback-Leibler (KL) distance [16, 17, 27].
It is far from being a metric. In particular, it is not sym-
metric under interchange of the two distributions being
compared.
It turns out that the simplest MF theories minimize the
KL distance from q to p. However it can be argued it is
the KL distance from p to q that is the most appropriate
measure, not the KL distance from q to p. Using that
distance, the optimal q is a new kind of approximation
not usually considered in statistical physics.
For the canonical ensemble, the type of KL distance
arising in simple MF theories turns out to be identical
to the maxent Lagrangian arising in bounded rational
game theory. This shows how bounded rational (inde-
pendent) players are formally identical to the particles in
the MF approximation to the canonical ensemble. Un-
der this identification, the moves of the players play the
roles of the states of the particles, and particle energies
are translated into player utilities. The coordinate trans-
formations which in game theory result in cooperative
games are, in statistical physics, techniques for more al-
lowing the canonical ensemble to be more accurately ap-
proximated with a product distribution.
This identification raises the potential of transferring
some of the powerful mathematical techniques that have
been developed in the statistical physics community to
the analysis of noncooperative game theory. In also sug-
gests translating some of the other ensembles of statisti-
cal physics to game theory, in addition to the canonical
ensemble. As an example, in the grand canonical ensem-
ble the number of particles is variable, which, after a MF
approximation, corresponds to having a variable number
of players in game theory. Among other applications, this
provides us with a new framework for analyzing games in
evolutionary scenarios, different from evolutionary game
theory.
In the next section noncooperative game theory and in-
formation theory are cursorily reviewed. Then bounded
rational game theory is derived, and its many advantages
are discussed. The following section starts with a cursory
review of the information-theoretic derivation of statisti-
cal physics. After that is a discussion of the two kinds of
KL distance and the MF theories they induce, and a dis-
cussion of coordinate systems. This section also includes
a discussion on translating a MF version of the grand
canonical ensemble into a new kind of evolutionary game
theory.
As discussed in the physics section, the maxent La-
grangian and associated Boltzmann solution at the core
of this paper has been investigated for an extremely long
time in the context of many-particle systems. Considered
in the context of a 2-player game with nature, the Boltz-
mann solution has also been studied for many years in
the reinforcement learning community [28, 29]. Related
work has considered it in the context of “mechanism de-
sign” of many players, i.e., in the context of designing the
utility functions of the players to induce them to maxi-
mize social welfare [30, 31, 32, 33].
It turns out that independent of the work reported in
this paper, the maxent Lagrangian and its Boltzmann so-
lution has been been muted in the context of game theory
[10, 34, 35]. However its motivation in that work is some-
what ad hoc. In that work there is no use of information
theory nor discussion of the relation between bounded
rational game theory and mean field theory. There is
also no relation of the maxent Lagrangian to the cost of
computation, multiple cost functions, rationality opera-
tors, or the kinds of alternatives to evolutionary game
theory discussed below. Nor is there discussion of semi-
coordinate transformations and their relation to cooper-
ative game theory.
Finally, it’s important to note that PD theory also has
many applications in science beyond those considered in
this paper. For example, see [21, 22, 36, 37, 38] for
work relating the maxent Lagrangian to distributed con-
trol and to distributed optimization. See [37] for algo-
rithms for speeding up convergence to bounded rational
equilibria. Some of those algorithms are related to sim-
ulated and deterministic annealing [27]. In [20] oth-
ers of those algorithms are related to Stackelberg games,
and more generally to the problem of finding the opti-
mal control hierarchy for team of players with a common
goal, i.e., finding an optimal organization chart. See also
[39, 40, 41] for work showing, respectively, how to use PD
theory to improve Metropolis-Hastings sampling, how to
relate it to the mechanism design work in [30, 31, 32, 33],
and how to extend it to continuous move spaces and time-
extended strategies.
II. PD THEORY AS BOUNDED RATIONAL
NONCOOPERATIVE GAME THEORY
This section motivates PD theory as a way of address-
ing several of the shortcomings of conventional noncoop-
erative game theory.
A. Review of noncooperative game theory
In noncooperative game theory one has a set of N
players. Each player i has its own set of allowed pure
strategies. A mixed strategy is a distribution qi(xi)
over player i’s possible pure strategies. Each player i also
has a utility function gi that maps the pure strategies
adopted by all N of the players into the real numbers.
3So given mixed strategies of all the players, the expected
utility of player i is E(gi) =
∫
dx
∏
j qj(xj)gi(x) [48].
This basic framework can be elaborated to model
many interactions between biological organisms, and in
particular between human beings. These interactions
range from simple abstractions like the famous prisoner’s
dilemma to iterated games like chess, to international re-
lations [3, 4, 42].
Much of noncooperative game theory is concerned with
equilibrium concepts specifying what joint-strategy
one should expect to result from a particular game. In
particular, in a Nash equilibrium every player adopts
the mixed strategy that maximizes its expected utility,
given the mixed strategies of the other players. More
formally, ∀i, qi = argmaxq′i
∫
dx q′i
∏
j 6=i qj(xj) gi(x).
Several very rich fields have benefited from a close re-
lationship with noncooperative game theory. Particular
examples are evolutionary game theory (in which the set
of N players is replaced by an infinite set of reproduc-
ing organisms) and cooperative game theory (in which
players choose which coalitions of other players to join)
[6, 43]. Game theory as a whole is also closely related
to economics, in particular the field of mechanism de-
sign, which is concerned with how to induce the set of
players to do adopt a socially desirable joint-strategy
[3, 44, 45, 46].
B. Problems with conventional noncooperative
game theory
A number of objections to the Nash equilibrium con-
cept have been resolved. In particular, it was Nash who
proved that every game has at least one Nash equilib-
rium if one expands the realm of discourse to include
mixed strategies. (The same is not true for pure strate-
gies.) Other objections have been more or less resolved
through numerous refinements of the Nash equilibrium
concept.
However there are several major problems with the
concept that are still outstanding. One of them is the
possible multiplicity of equilibria; this multiplicity means
the Nash equilibrium concept cannot be used to specify
the joint strategy that is actually adopted in a real world
game. (Some refinements of the Nash equilibrium con-
cept attempt to address this problem, though none has
succeeded.) Another problem is that while calculating
Nash equilibria is straightforward in many simple games
(e.g., 2 players in a zero-sum game), calculating them
in the general case can be a very difficult computational
multi-criteria optimization problem. Yet another prob-
lem is that there is no general way to extend the concept
to allow each player to have multiple utility functions.
However perhaps the major problem with the Nash
equilibrium concept is its assumption of full rational-
ity. This is the assumption that every player i can both
calculate what the strategies qj 6=i will be and then calcu-
late its associated optimal distribution. In other words,
it is the assumption that every player will calculate the
entire joint distribution q(x) =
∏
j qj(xj). If for no other
reasons than computational limitations of real humans,
this assumption is essentially untenable. This problem is
just as severe if one allows statistical coupling among the
players [3, 47].
A large body of empirical lore has been generated char-
acterizing the bounded rationality of humans. Similarly
much has been learned about the empirical behavior
of (bounded rational) machine learning computer algo-
rithms playing games with one another [7, 13]. None of
this work has resulted in a full mathematical theory of
bounded rationality however.
There have also been numerous theoretical attempts
to incorporate bounded rationality into noncooperative
game theory by modifying the Nash equilibrium con-
cept. Some of them assume essentially that every player’s
mixed strategy is its Nash-optimal strategy with some
form of noise superimposed [6]. Others explicitly model
the humans, typically as computationally limited au-
tomata, and assume the automata perform optimally
subject to those computational limitations [10]. Both
approaches, while providing insight, are very ad hoc as
models of games involving real-world organisms or real-
world (i.e., non-trivial) machine learning algorithms.
The difficulty of calculating equilibria is addressed in
the sections below on solving for the distributions of PD
theory. The rest of this section shows how information
theory can be used to extend game theory to avoid its
other shortcomings. Finally, the sections after this one
present some other extensions of game theory, in partic-
ular to allow for a variable number of players. (Games
with variable number of players arise in many biological
scenarios as well as economic ones.)
C. Review of the maximum entropy principle
Shannon was the first person to realize that based
on any of several separate sets of very simple desider-
ata, there is a unique real-valued quantification of the
amount of syntactic information in a distribution P (y).
He showed that this amount of information is (the nega-
tive of) the Shannon entropy of that distribution, S(P ) =
−
∫
dy P (y)ln[P (y)
µ(y) ] [49].
So for example, the distribution with minimal infor-
mation is the one that doesn’t distinguish at all between
the various y, i.e., the uniform distribution. Conversely,
the most informative distribution is the one that specifies
a single possible y. Note that for a product distribution,
entropy is additive, i.e., S(
∏
i qi(yi)) =
∑
i S(qi).
Say we given some incomplete prior knowledge about a
distribution P (y). How should one estimate P (y) based
on that prior knowledge? Shannon’s result tells us how to
do that in the most conservative way: have your estimate
of P (y) contain the minimal amount of extra information
beyond that already contained in the prior knowledge
about P (y). Intuitively, this can be viewed as a version
4of Occam’s razor. This approach is called the maximum
entropy (maxent) principle. It has proven extremely use-
ful in domains ranging from signal processing to image
processing to supervised learning [17].
D. Maxent Lagrangians
Much of the work on equilibrium concepts in game the-
ory adopts the perspective of an external observer of a
game. We are told something concerning the game, e.g.,
its utility functions, information sets, etc., and from that
wish to predict what joint strategy will be followed by
real-world players of the game. Say that in addition to
such information, we are told the expected utilities of
the players. What is our best estimate of the distribu-
tion q that generated those expected utility values? By
the maxent principle, it is the distribution with maximal
entropy, subject to those expectation values.
To formalize this, for simplicity assume a finite num-
ber of players and of possible strategies for each player.
To agree with the convention in other fields, from now on
we implicitly flip the sign of each gi so that the associ-
ated player i wants to minimize that function rather than
maximize it. Intuitively, this flipped gi(x) is the “cost”
to player i when the joint-strategy is x, rather than its
utility then.
Then for prior knowledge that the expected utilities of
the players are given by the set of values {ǫi}, the maxent
estimate of the associated q is given by the minimizer of
the Lagrangian
L(q) ≡
∑
i
βi[Eq(gi)− ǫi]− S(q)
=
∑
i
βi[
∫
dx
∏
j
qj(xj)gi(x)− ǫi]− S(q) (1)
where the subscript on the expectation value indicates
that it evaluated under distribution q, and the {βi} are
Lagrange parameters implicitly set by the constraints on
the expected utilities [50].
Solving, we find that the mixed strategies minimizing
the Lagrangian are related to each other via
qi(xi) ∝ e
−Eq(i) (G|xi) (2)
where the overall proportionality constant for each i is
set by normalization, and G ≡
∑
i βigi, and the subscript
q(i) on the expectation value indicates that it is evaluated
according the distribution
∏
j 6=i qj . In Eq. 2 the proba-
bility of player i choosing pure strategy xi depends on the
effect of that choice on the utilities of the other players.
This reflects the fact that our prior knowledge concerns
all the players equally.
If we wish to focus only on the behavior of player i,
it is appropriate to modify our prior knowledge. To see
how to do this, first consider the case of maximal prior
knowledge, in which we know the actual joint-strategy of
the players, and therefore all of their expected costs. For
this case, trivially, the maxent principle says we should
“estimate” q as that joint-strategy (it being the q with
maximal entropy that is consistent with our prior knowl-
edge). The same conclusion holds if our prior knowledge
also includes the expected cost of player i.
Now modify this maximal set of prior knowledge by
removing from it specification of player i’s strategy. So
our prior knowledge is the mixed strategies of all players
other than i, together with player i’s expected cost. We
can incorporate the prior knowledge of the other players’
mixed strategies directly into our Lagrangian, without
introducing Lagrange parameters. That maxent La-
grangian is
Li(qi) ≡ βi[ǫi − E(gi)]− Si(qi)
= βi[ǫi −
∫
dx
∏
j
qj(xj)gi(x)] − Si(qi)
with solution given by a set of coupled Boltzmann dis-
tributions:
qi(xi) ∝ e
−βiEq(i) (gi|xi). (3)
Following Nash, we can use Brouwer’s fixed point the-
orem to establish that for any non-negative values {β},
there must exist at least one product distribution given
by the product of these Boltzmann distributions (one
term in the product for each i).
The first term in Li is minimized by a perfectly rational
player. The second term is minimized by a perfectly irra-
tional player, i.e., by a perfectly uniform mixed strategy
qi. So βi in the maxent Lagrangian explicitly specifies the
balance between the rational and irrational behavior of
the player. In particular, for β → ∞, by minimizing the
Lagrangians we recover the Nash equilibria of the game.
More formally, in that limit the set of q that simultane-
ously minimize the Lagrangians is the same as the set of
delta functions about the Nash equilibria of the game.
The same is true for Eq. 2.
Eq. 2 is just a special case of Eq. 3, where all player’s
share the same cost function G. (Such games are known
as team games.) This relationship reflects the fact
that for this case, the difference between the maxent La-
grangian and the one in Eq. 1 is independent of qi. Due
to this relationship, our guarantee of the existence of a
solution to the set of maxent Lagrangians implies the
existence of a solution of the form Eq. 2.
Typically players aren’t close to perfectly self-
defeating. Almost always they will be closer to mini-
mizing their expected cost than maximizing it. For prior
knowledge consistent with such a case, the βi are all non-
negative.
Finally, our prior knowledge often will not consist of
exact specification of the expected costs of the players,
even if that knowledge arises from watching the players
make their moves. Such other kinds of prior knowledge
are addressed in several of the following subsections.
5E. Alternative interpretations of Lagrangians
There are numerous alternative interpretations of these
results. For example, change our prior knowledge to be
the entropy of each player i’s strategy, i.e., how unsure
it is of what move to make. Now we cannot use informa-
tion theory to make our estimate of q. Given that players
try to minimize expected cost, a reasonable alternative
is to predict that each player i’s expected cost will be as
small as possible, subject to that provided value of the
entropy and the other players’ strategies. The associated
Lagrangians are αi[S(qi) − σi] − E(gi), where σi is the
provided entropy value. This is equivalent to the max-
ent Lagrangian, and in particular has the same solution,
Eq. 3.
Another alternative interpretation involves world
cost functions, which are quantifications of the qual-
ity of a joint pure strategy x from the point of view
of an external observer (e.g., a system designer, the
government, an auctioneer, etc.). A particular class
of world cost functions are “social welfare functions”,
which can be expressed in terms of the cost functions
of the individual players. Perhaps the simplest example
is G(x) =
∑
i βigi(x), where the βi serve to trade off how
much we value one player’s cost vs. anothers. If we know
the value of this social welfare function, but nothing else,
then maxent tells us to minimize the Lagrangian of Eq. 1.
F. Bounded rational game theory
In many situations we have prior knowledge different
from (or in addition to) expected values of cost functions.
This is particularly true when the players are human be-
ings (so that behavioral economics studies can be brought
to bear) or simple computational algorithms. To apply
information theory in such situations, we simply need to
incorporate that prior knowledge into our Lagrangian(s).
To give a simple example, say that we know that the
players all want to ensure not just a low expected cost,
but also that the actual cost doesn’t vary too much from
one sample of q to the next. We can formalize this by say-
ing that in addition to expected costs, our prior knowl-
edge includes variances in the costs. Given the expected
values of the costs, such variances are specified by the ex-
pected values of the squares of the cost. Accordingly, all
our prior knowledge is in the form of expectation values.
Modifying Eq. 3 appropriately, we arrive at the solution
qi(xi) ∝ e
−Eq(i) (αi(gi−λi)
2|xi).
where the Lagrange parameters αi and λi are given by
the provided expectations and variances of the costs of
the players.
Eq. 4 is our best guess for what the actual mixed strat-
egy of player i is, in light of our prior knowledge concern-
ing that player. Note that this formula directly reflects
the fact that player i does not care only about minimiz-
ing cost, i.e., maximizing utility. In this, we are directly
incorporating the possibility that the player violates the
axioms of utility theory — something never allowed in
conventional game theory. Other behavioral economics
phenomena like risk aversion can be treated in a similar
fashion.
A variant of this scenario would have our prior knowl-
edge only give the variances of the costs of the players
and not their expected costs. In this cost the Lagrangian
must involve a term quadratic in q, in addition to the
entropy term and a term linear in q. (See the subsection
on multiple cost functions.) More generally, our prior
knowledge can be any nonlinear function of q. In addi-
tion, even if we stick to prior knowledge that is linear in q,
that knowledge can couple the cost functions of the play-
ers. For example, if we know that the expected difference
in cost of players i and j is ǫ, the associated Lagrange
constraint term is
∫
dxq(x)[gi(x)− gj(x)− ǫ]. In this sit-
uation our prior knowledge couples the strategies of the
players, even though those players are independent. See
the discussion on constrained optimization in Sec. Opt.
G. Cost of computation
As mentioned above, bounded rationality is an un-
avoidable consequence of the cost of computation to
player i of finding its optimal strategy. Unfortunately,
one cannot simply incorporate that cost into gi, and then
presume that the player acts perfectly rationally for this
new gi. The reason is that this cost is associated with the
entire distribution qi(xi) that player i calculates; it not
associated with some particular joint-strategy formed by
sampling such a distribution.
How might we quantify the cost of calculating qi? The
natural approach is to use information theory. Indeed,
that cost arises naturally in the bounded rationality for-
mulation of game theory presented above. To see how,
for each player i define
fi(x, qi(xi)) ≡ βigi(x) + ln[qi(xi)].
Then we can write the maxent Lagrangian for player i as
Li(q) =
∫
dx q(x)fi(x, qi(xi)). (4)
Now in a bounded rational game every player sets its
strategy to minimize its Lagrangian, given the strategies
of the other players. In light of Eq. 4, this means that we
can interpret each player in a bounded rational game as
being perfectly rational for a cost function that incorpo-
rates its computational cost. To do so we simply need to
expand the domain of “cost functions” to include proba-
bility values as well as joint moves.
Similar results hold for non-maxent Lagrangians. All
that’s needed is that we can write such a Lagrangian in
the form of Eq. 4 for some appropriate function fi.
6H. Multiple cost functions per player
Say player i has several different cost functions {gji }
and wants to choose a strategy that will do well at all of
them. In the case of pure strategies we can simply define
an aggregate function like maxjg
j
i (x) or
∑
j [g
j
i (x)]
2, and
employ that in a conventional, single-cost-function-per-
player game theoretic analysis. Player i will perform well
according to such a function iff it performs well according
to all of the constituent gji .
One might think that for mixed strategies one could
just “roll up” the cost functions and say that player
i works to minimize an aggregate cost function
∑
j g
j
i∑
j 1
.
However especially when player i has many cost func-
tions, it may be that performance according to one or
more of the constituent cost functions is quite bad even
though the performance according to this average func-
tion is good. Similarly, player i can have a low value
of the expectation of the minimum of its cost func-
tions, even though the minimum of the expected costs
is quite high. More generally, we cannot ensure that
Eq(g
j
i ) =
∫
dx gji (x)qi(x)q(i)(x(i)) has a good value for
all j by appropriately defining an aggregate gi. Instead,
we must “redefine” expected cost.
We can address this by modifying our goals, in anal-
ogy with the goals typically ascribed to players playing
pure strategies. We do this by having the choice of cost
function for player i be controlled by a fictional player.
For example, conventional game theory analyzes the case
where player i chooses a pure strategy to minimize the
worst case (over other players’ moves) cost to i, i.e., to
minimize maxx(i)g
i(xi, x(i). Here the analogy would be
for the player to choose a mixed strategy to minimize the
worst case (over moves by the fictional player) expected
cost, i.e., to minimize maxjEq(g
j
i ). A similar choice, ap-
propriate when the cost functions are all positive-definite,
is for player i to minimize
∑
j [Eq(g
j
i )]
2.[51] Formally,
such functions are just Lagrangians of q. If we wish,
we can modify them to incorporate bounded rationality,
getting Lagrangians like
∑
j βj [Eq(g
j
i )]
2 − S(qi), where
the βj determine the relative rationalities of player i ac-
cording to its various cost functions.
These kinds of Lagrangians can also model the pro-
cess of mechanism design, where there is an external
designer who induces the players to adopt a desirable
joint-strategy [3]. As an example, “desirable” sometimes
means that no single player’s expected cost is high. A
system that meets this goal fairly well can be modeled
with a Lagrangian involving terms like
∑
i[Eq(gi)]
2.
I. Shape of the Lagrangian surface
To analyze the shape of the Lagrangian, we start with
the following lemma, which extends the technique of La-
grange parameters to off-equilibrium points:
Lemma 1: Consider the set of all vectors leading from
x′ ∈ Rn that are, to first order, consistent with a set of
constraints over Rn. Of those vectors, the one giving the
steepest ascent of a function V (x) is ~u = ∇V +
∑
i λi∇fi,
up to an overall proportionality constant, where the λi
enforce the first order consistency conditions, ~u · ∇fi =
0 ∀i.
This lemma can be used to establish that at the edge
of Q, the space of all product distributions q, the steepest
descent direction of any player’s Lagrangian points into
the interior of Q (assuming finite β and {gi}). Accord-
ingly, whereas Nash equilibria can be on the edge of Q
(e.g., for a pure strategy Nash equilibrium), in bounded
rational games any equilibrium must lie in the interior of
Q. In other words, any equilibrium (i.e., any local min-
imum) of a bounded rational game has non-zero proba-
bility for all joint moves. So we never have to consider
extremal mixed strategies in searching for equilibria.
Lemma 1 can also be used to construct examples of
games with more than one bounded rational equilibrium
(just like there are games with more than Nash equilib-
rium). One can also show that for every player i and
any point q interior to Q, there are directions in Q along
which i’s Lagrangian is locally convex. Accordingly, no
player’s Lagrangian has a local maximum interior to Q.
So if there are multiple local minima of i’s Lagrangian,
they are separated by saddle points across ridges. Sim-
ilarly, the uniform q is a solution to the set of coupled
equations Eq. 3 for a team game, but typically is not a
local minimum, and therefore must be a saddle point.
Say we modify the Lagrangians to be defined for all
possible p, not just those that are product distributions.
For example the Lagrangian of Eq. 1 becomes
L(p) ≡
∑
i
βi[
∫
dx gi(x)p(x) − ǫi]− S(p).
The first term in this Lagrangian is linear in p. Since en-
tropy is a concave function of the Euclidean vector p over
the unit simplex, this means that the overall Lagrangian
is a convex function of p over the space of allowed p. This
means there is a unique minimum of the Lagrangian over
the space of all possible legal p. Furthermore, as men-
tioned previously, for finite β at least one of the deriva-
tives of the Lagrangian is negative infinite at the border
of the allowed region of p. This means that the unique
minimum of the Lagrangian is interior to that region, i.e.,
is a legal probability distribution.
In general this optimal p will not be a product dis-
tribution, of course. Rather the strategy choices of the
players are typically statistically coupled, under this p.
Such coupling is very suggestive of various stochastic for-
mulations of noncooperative game theory. Coupling also
arises in cooperative game theory, in which binding con-
tracts couple the moves of the players [6, 42].
Similarly, as in proven in the appendix, the Lagrangian
L(p) = β
∑
i[Ep(gi)]
2 − S(p) is convex over the manifold
of legal p, assuming non-negative β. So the model of
7mechanism design introduced in Sec. II H has a unique
equilibrium — if we allow the players to be statistically
coupled.
J. Rationality operators
Often our prior knowledge will not concern expected
costs. In particular, this is usually true if our prior knowl-
edge is provided to us before the game is played, rather
than afterward. In such a situation, prior knowledge will
more likely concern the “intelligences” of the players, i.e.,
how close they are to being rational. In particular, if
we want our prior knowledge concerning player i to be
relatively independent of what the other players do, we
cannot use i’s expected cost as our prior knowledge. Our
prior knowledge will often concern how peaked i’s mixed
strategy is about whichever of its moves minimize its cost
(or how peaked we can assume it to be), not the associ-
ated minimal cost values.
Formally, the problem faced by player i is how to set
its mixed strategy qi(xi) so as to maximize the expected
value of its effective cost function, E(gi | xi). General-
izing, what we want is a rationality operator R(U, p) that
measures how peaked an arbitrary distribution p(y) is
about the minimizers of an arbitrary cost function U(y),
argminyU(y).
Formally, we make two requirements of R:
1. If p(y) ∝ e−βU(y), for non-negative β, then it is
natural to require that the peakedness of the dis-
tribution — its rationality value — is β.
2. We also need to also specify something of R(U, p)’s
behavior for non-Boltzmann p. It will suffice to
require that of the p satisfying R(U, p) = β, the
one that has maximal entropy is proportional to
e−βU(y). In other words, we require that the Boltz-
mann distribution maximizes entropy subject to a
provided value of the rationality operator.
As an illustration, a natural choice for R(U, p) would be
the β of the Boltzmann distribution that “best fits” p.
Information theory provides us such a measure for how
well a distribution p1 is fit by a distribution p2. This is
the Kullback-Leibler distance [16, 27]:
KL(p1 || p2) ≡ S(p1 || p2)− S(p1) (5)
where S(p1 || p2) ≡ −
∫
dy p1(y)ln[
p2(y)
µ(y) ] is known as
the cross entropy from p1 to p2 (and as usual we im-
plicitly choose uniform µ). The KL distance is always
non-negative, and equals zero iff its two arguments are
identical.
Define N(U) ≡
∫
dy e−U(y), the normalization con-
stant for the distribution proportional to e−U(y). (This
is called the partition function in statistical physics.)
Then using the KL distance, we arrive at the rationality
operator
RKL(U, p) ≡ argminβKL(p ||
e−βU
N(βU)
)
= argminβ [β
∫
dy p(y)U(y) + ln(N(βU))].
In the appendix it is proven that RKL respects the two
requirements of rationality operators.
The quantity ln(N(βU)) appearing in the second equa-
tion, when scaled by β−1, is called the free energy. It
is easy to verify that it equals the Lagrangian Ep(U) −
S(p)/β if p is given by the Boltzmann distribution p(y) ∝
e−βU(y).
Say our prior knowledge is {ρi}, the rationalities of
the players for their associated effective cost functions.
Introduce the general notation
[U ]i,p(xi) ≡
∫
dx(i)U(xi, x(i))p(x(i) | xi),
so that [gi]i,q is player i’s effective cost function. Then
the Lagrangian for our prior knowledge is
L(q) =
∑
i
λi[R([gi]i,q, qi)− ρi] − S(q). (6)
where the λi are the Lagrange parameters. Just as be-
fore, there is an alternative way to motivate this Lagan-
gian: if our prior knowledge consists of the entropy of
the joint system, and we assume each player will have
maximal rationality subject to that prior knowledge, we
are led to the Lagrangian of Eq. 6.
It is shown in the appendix that for the Kullback-
Leibler rationality operator, we can replace any con-
straint of the form R([gi]i,q, qi) = ρi with Eq(gi) =∫
dx gi(x)
e−ρiE(gi|xi)
N(ρigi)
q(i)(x(i)). In other words, knowing
that player i has KL rationality ρi is equivalent to know-
ing that the actual expected value of gi equals the “ideal
expected value”, where qi is replaced by the Boltzmann
distribution of Eq. 3 with β = ρi. This contrasts with
the prior knowledge underlying the Lagrangian in Eq. 1,
in which we know the actual numerical value of Eq(gi).
Just as before, we can focus on player i by augmenting
our prior knowledge to include the strategies of all the
other players. The associated Lagrangian is
Li(qi) = λi[R([gi]i,q, qi)− ρi] − S(qi). (7)
(The prior knowledge concerning the strategies of the
other players is manifested in the effective cost function.)
It is shown in the appendix that the set of all the La-
grangians in Eq. 7 (one for each player) are minimized
simultaneously by any distribution of the form
qg ≡
∏
i e
−ρi[gi]i,q
N(ρi[gi]i,q)
In addition, since this distribution obeys all the con-
straints in the Lagrangian in Eq. 6, we know that there
8exists a minimizer of that Lagrangian. All of this holds
regardless of the precise rationality operator one uses.
Note that the Lagrangian Li of Eq. 7 for player i
arises in response to prior knowledge specific to player
i. Changing from one player and its Lagrangian to an-
other changes the prior knowledge. (The same is true for
the Lagrangians in Eq. 3.) In contrast, the Lagrangian of
Eq. 6 arises for a single unified body of prior knowledge,
namely the set of all players’ rationalities.
For that single body of knowledge, the equilibrium of
the game is the solution to a single-objective optimization
problem. This contrasts with the conventional formula-
tion of full rationality game theory, where the equilibrium
is cast as a solution to a multi-objective optimization
problem (one objective per player). Furthermore, for fi-
nite β, at least one of the derivatives of the Lagrangian
is negative infinite at the border of the allowed region of
product distributions (i.e., at the border of the Cartesian
product of unit simplices). Accordingly, all solutions lie
in the interior of that region. This can be a big advan-
tage for finding such solutions numerically, as elaborated
below.
K. Semi-coordinate systems
Consider a multi-stage game like chess, with the stages
(i.e., the instants at which one of the players makes a
move) delineated by t. Now strategies are what are set
by the players before play starts. So in such a multi-stage
game the strategy of player i, xi, must be the set of t-
indexed maps taking what that player has observed in
the stages t′ < t into its move at stage t. Formally, this
set of maps is called player i’s normal form strategy.
The joint strategy of the two players in chess sets their
joint move-sequence, though in general the reverse need
not be true. In addition, one can always find a joint
strategy to result in any particular joint move-sequence.
More generally, any onto mapping ζ : x → z, not neces-
sarily invertible, is called a semi-coordinate system.
The identity mapping z → z is a trivial example of a
semi-coordinate system. Another example is the map-
ping from joint-strategies in a multi-stage game to joint
move-sequences is an example of a semi-coordinate sys-
tem. So changing the representation space of a multi-
stage game from move-sequences z to strategies x is a
semi-coordinate transformation of that game.
Typically there is overlap in what the players in chess
have observed at stages preceding the current one. This
means that even if the players’ strategies are statistically
independent, their move sequences are statistically cou-
pled. In such a situation, by parameterizing the space of
joint-move-sequences z with joint-strategies x, we shift
our focus from the coupled distribution P (z) to the de-
coupled product distribution, q(x). This is the advan-
tage of casting multi-stage games in terms of normal form
strategies.
We can perform a semi-coordinate transformation even
in a single-stage game. Say we restrict attention to dis-
tributions over spaces of possible x that are product dis-
tributions. Then changing ζ(.) from the identity map
to some other function means that the players are no
longer independent. After the transformation their strat-
egy choices — the components of z — are statistically
coupled, even though we are considering a product dis-
tribution.
Formally, this is expressed via the standard rule for
transforming probabilities,
Pz(z) ≡ ζ(Px) ≡
∫
dxPx(x)δ(z − ζ(x)), (8)
where ζ(.) is the mapping from x to z, and Px and Pz are
the distributions across x-space and z-space, respectively.
To see what this rule means geometrically, let P be the
space of all distributions (product or otherwise) over z’s.
Recall that Q is the space of all product distributions
over x, and let ζ(Q) be the image of Q in P . Then by
changing ζ(.), we change that image; different choices of
ζ(.) will result in different manifolds ζ(Q).
As an example, say we have two players, with two pos-
sible strategies each. So z consists of the possible joint
strategies, labeled (1, 1), (1, 2), (2, 1) and (2, 2). Have the
space of possible x equal the space of possible z, and
choose ζ(1, 1) = (1, 1), ζ(1, 2) = (2, 2), ζ(2, 1) = (2, 1),
and ζ(2, 2) = (1, 2). Say that q is given by q1(x1 =
1) = q2(x2 = 1) = 2/3. Then the distribution over
joint-strategies z is Pz(1, 1) = Px(1, 1) = 4/9, Pz(2, 1) =
Pz(2, 2) = 2/9, Pz(1, 2) = 1/9. So Pz(z) 6= Pz(z1)Pz(z2);
the strategies of the players are statistically coupled.
Such coupling of the players’ strategies can be viewed
as a manifestation of sets of potential binding contracts.
To illustrate this return to our two player example. Each
possible value of a component xi determines a pair of
possible joint strategies. For example, setting x1 = 1
means the possible joint strategies are (1, 1) and (2, 2).
Accordingly such a value of xi can be viewed as a set
of proffered binding contracts. The value of the other
components of x determines which contract is accepted;
it is the intersection of the proffered contracts offered
by all the components of x that determines what single
contract is selected. Continuing with our example, given
that x1 = 1, whether the joint-strategy is (1, 1) or (2, 2)
(the two options offered by x1) is determined by the value
of x2.
Binding contracts are a central component of coopera-
tive game theory. In this sense, semi-coordinate transfor-
mations can be viewed as a way to convert noncoopera-
tive game theory into a form of cooperative game theory.
While the distribution over x uniquely sets the distri-
bution over z, the reverse is not true. However so long as
our Lagrangian directly concerns the distribution over x
rather than the distribution over z, by minimizing that
Lagrangian we set a distribution over z. In this way
we can minimize a Lagrangian involving product distri-
butions, even though the associated distribution in the
ultimate space of interest is not a product distribution.
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prior information, as usual. If we want that Lagrangian
to include an expected value over z’s (e.g., of a cost func-
tion), we can directly incorporate that expectation value
into the Lagrangian over x’s, since expected values in x
and z are identical:
∫
dzPz(z)A(z) =
∫
dxPx(x)A(ζ(x))
for any function A(z). (Indeed, this is the standard justi-
fication of the rule for transforming probabilities, Eq. 8.)
However other functionals of probability distributions
can differ between the two spaces. This is especially com-
mon when ζ(.) is not invertible, so the space of possible
x is larger than the space of possible z. For example, in
general the entropy of a q ∈ Q will differ from that of its
image, ζ(q) ∈ ζ(Q) in such a case. (The prior probabil-
ity µ in the definition of entropy only gives us invariance
when the two spaces have the same cardinality.) A cor-
rection factor is necessary to relate the two entropies.
In such cases, we have to be careful about which space
we use to formulate our Lagrangian. If we use the trans-
formation ζ(.) as a tool to allow us to analyze bargaining
games with binding contracts, then the direct space of
interest is actually the x’s (that is the place in which the
players make their bargaining moves). In such cases it
makes sense to apply all the analysis of the preceding
sections exactly as it is written, concerning Lagrangians
and distributions over x rather than z (so long as we re-
define cost functions to implicitly pre-apply the mapping
ζ(.) to their arguments). However if we instead use ζ(.)
simply as a way of establishing statistical dependencies
among the strategies of the players, it may make sense
to include the entropy correction factor in our x-space
Lagrangian.
An important special case is where the following three
conditions are met: Each point z is the image under
ζ(.) of the same number of points in x-space, n; µ(x)
is uniform (and therefore so is µ(z)); and the Lagrangian
in x-space, Lx, is a sum of expected costs and the en-
tropy. In this situation, consider a z-space Lagrangian,
Lz, whose functional dependence on Pz , the distribution
over z’s, is identical to the dependence of Lx on Px, ex-
cept that the entropy term is divided by n [52]. Now
the minimizer P ∗(x) of Lx is a Boltzmann distribution
in values of the cost function(s). Accordingly, for any
z, P ∗(x) is uniform across all n points x ∈ ζ−1(z) (all
such x have the same cost value(s)). This in turn means
that S(ζ(Px)) = nS(Pz) So our two Lagrangians give the
same solution, i.e., the “correction factor” for the entropy
term is just multiplication by n.
L. Entropic prior game theory
Finally, it is worth noting that in the real world the
information we are provided concerning the system often
will not consist of exact values of functionals of q, be those
values expected costs, rationalities, or what have you.
Rather that knowledge will be in the form of data, D,
together with an associated likelihood function over the
space of q. For example, that knowledge might consist of
a bias toward particular rationality values, rather than
precisely specified values:
P (D | q) ∝ e−α
∑
i[RKL([gi]i,q)−ρi]
2
.
where α sets the strength of the bias.
The extension of the maximum entropy principle to
such situations uses the entropic prior, P (q) ∝ e−γS(q).
Bayes’ theorem is then invoked to get the posterior dis-
tribution [18]:
P (q | D) ∝ e−
∑
i αi[RKL([gi]i,q)−ρi]
2−γS(q).
The Bayes optimal estimate for q, under a quadratic
penalty term, is then given by E(q | D). The maxent
principle for estimating q is given by this estimate under
the limit of all αi going to infinity. For finite α solv-
ing for E(q | D) can be quite complicated though. For
simplicity, such cases are not considered here.
III. PD THEORY AND STATISTICAL PHYSICS
There are many connections between bounded ratio-
nal game theory — PD theory — and statistical physics.
This should not be too surprising, given that many of the
important concepts in bounded rational game theory, like
the Boltzmann distribution, the partition function, and
free energy, were first explored in statistical physics. This
section discusses some of these connections.
A. Background on statistical physics
Statistical physics is the physics of systems about
which we have incomplete information. An example is
knowing only the expected value of a system’s energy
(i.e., its temperature) rather than the precise value of the
energy. The statistical physics of such systems is known
as the canonical ensemble. Another example is the
grand canonical ensemble (GCE). There the number
of particles of various types in the system is also uncer-
tain. As in the canonical ensemble, in the GCE what
knowledge we do have takes the form of expectation val-
ues of the quantities about which we are uncertain, i.e.,
the number of particles of the various types that the sys-
tem contains, and the energy the system.
Traditionally these kinds of ensembles were analyzed
in terms of “baths” of the uncertain variable that are
connected to the system. For example, in the canonical
ensemble the system is connected to a heat bath. In the
GCE the system is also connected to a bath of particles
of the various types.
Such analysis showed that for the canonical ensem-
ble the probability of the system being in the particular
state x is given by the Boltzmann distribution over the
associated value of the system’s energy, G(x), with β
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interpreted as the (inverse) temperature of the system:
p(x) ∝ e−βG(x). This result is independent of the details
characteristics of the physical system; all that is impor-
tant is the Hamiltonian G(x), and temperature β.
Note that once one knows p(x) and G(x), one knows
the expected energy of the system. It is G(x) that is a
fixed property of the system, whereas β can vary. Ac-
cordingly, specifying β is exactly equivalent to specifying
the expected energy of the system.
In the case of the GCE, x implicitly specifies the num-
ber of particles of the various types, as well as their
precise state. The analysis for that case showed that
p(x) ∝ e−βG(x)−
∑
i µini . In this formula β is again the
inverse temperature, ni is the number of particles of type
i, and µi > 0 is the chemical potential of each particle
of type i.
Jaynes was the first to show that these results of con-
ventional statistical physics could be derived without re-
course to artificial notions like “baths”, simply by using
the maxent principle. In particular, he used the exact
reasoning in Sec. II F to derive the fact that the canoni-
cal ensemble is governed by the Boltzmann distribution.
B. Mean field theory and PD theory
In practice it can be quite difficult to evaluate this
Boltzmann distribution, due to difficulty in evaluating
the partition function. For example, in a spin glass,
x is an N -dimensional vector of bits, one per particle,
and G(x) =
∑
i,j Hi,jxixj . So the partition function
is given by
∫
dxe−
∑
i,j Hi,jxixj , where H is a symmet-
ric real-valued matrix, and as before we use
∫
to indicate
the integral according to the appropriate measure (here
a point-sum measure). In general, evaluating this sum
for large numbers of spins cannot be done in closed form.
Mean Field (MF) theory is a technique for getting
around this problem by approximating the partition
function. Intuitively, it works by treating all the parti-
cles as independent. It does this by replacing some of the
values of the state of a particle in the Hamiltonian by its
average state. For example, in the case of the spin glass,
one approximates
∑
i,j Hi,j [xi − E(xi)][xj − E(xj)] ≅ 0,
where the expectation values are evaluated according to
the associated exact Boltzmann distribution, i.e., one as-
sumes that fluctuations about the means are relatively
negligible. This then means that
G(x) ≅
∑
i,j
Hi,j2xiE(xj) −
∑
i,j
Hi,jE(xi)E(xj),
The second sum in this approximation cancels out when
we evaluate the associated approximate Boltzmann dis-
tribution, leaving us with the distribution
pβU (x) ≅ P βU (x) ≡
e−β
∑
i,j Hi,j2xiE(xj)∫
dx e−β
∑
i,j Hi,j2xiE(xj)
=
∏
i
e−αixi∫
dxi e−αixi
,
where
αi ≡ 2β
∑
j
Hi,jE(xj).
This approximation P βU (x) is far easier to work
with than the exact Boltzmann distribution, pβU (x) =
e−βG(x)
N(βU) , since each term in the product is for a single spin
by itself. In particular, if we adopt this approximation
we can use numerical techniques to solve the associated
set of simultaneous equations
E(xi) =
∂
∂αi
[
∫
dxi e
−αixi ] ∀i
for the E(xi) (so that those E(xi) are no longer exactly
equal to the expected values of the {xi} under the distri-
bution pβU (x)). Given those E(xi) values, we can then
evaluate the associated approximate Boltzmann distribu-
tion explicitly.
The mean field approximation to the Boltzmann dis-
tribution is a product distribution, and in fact is identical
to the product distribution qg of bounded rational game
theory, for the team game where gi(x) = 2βG(x) ∀i. Ac-
cordingly, the “mean field theory” approximation for an
arbitrary Hamiltonian U can be taken to be the associ-
ated team game qg, which is defined for any U .
This bridge between bounded rational game theory and
statistical physics means that many of the powerful tools
that have been developed in statistical physics can be ap-
plied to bounded rational game theory. They also mean
that PD theoretic techniques can be applied in statisti-
cal physics. In particular, it is shown elsewhere [20, 21]
that if one replaces the identical cost function of each
player in a team game with different cost functions, then
the bounded rational equilibrium of that game can be
numerically found far more quickly. In the context of
statistical physics, this means that numerically solving
for a MF approximation may be expedited by assigning
a different Hamiltonian to each particle.
C. Information-theoretic misfit measures
The proper way to approximate a target distribution p
with a distribution from a set C is to first specify a misfit
measure saying how well each member of C approximates
p, and then solve for the member with the smallest mis-
fit. This is just as true when C is the set of all product
distributions as when it is any other set.
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How best to measure distances between probability
distributions is a topic of ongoing controversy and re-
search [26]. The most common way to do so is with the
infinite limit log likelihood of data being generated by
one distribution but misattributed to have come from
the other. This is know as the Kullback-Leibler dis-
tance [16, 17, 27]:
KL(p1 || p2) ≡ S(p1 || p2)− S(p1) (9)
where S(p1 || p2) ≡ −
∫
dx p1(x)ln[
p2(x)
µ(x) ] is known as the
cross entropy from p1 to p2 (and as usual we implic-
itly choose uniform µ). The KL distance is always non-
negative, and equals zero iff its two arguments are identi-
cal. However it it is far from being a metric. In addition
to violating the triangle inequality, it is not symmetric
under interchange of its arguments, and in numerical ap-
plications has a tendency to blow up. (That happens
whenever the support of p1 includes points outside the
support of p2.)
Nonetheless, this is by far the most popular measure.
It is illuminating to use it as our misfit measure. As
shorthand, define the “pq distance” as KL(p || q), and
the “qp distance” as KL(q || p, where p is our target
distribution and q is a product distribution. Then it is
straightforward to show that the qp distance from q to
target distribution pβU is just the maxent Lagrangian,
up to irrelevant overall constants. In other words, the
q minimizing the maxent Lagrangian — the distribution
arising in MF theory — is the q with the minimal qp
distance to the associated Boltzmann distribution.
However the qp distance is the (infinite limit of the
negative log of) the likelihood that distribution p would
attribute to data generated by distribution q. It can be
argued that a better measure of how well q approximates
p would be based on the likelihood that q attributes to
data generated by p. This is the pq distance. Up to an
overall additive constant (of the canonical distribution’s
entropy), the pq distance is
KL(p || q) = −
∑
i
∫
dx p(x)ln[qi(xi)].
This is equivalent to a team game where each coordinate
i has the “Lagrangian”
L∗i (q) ≡ −
∫
dxi pi(xi)ln[qi(i)],
where pi(xi) is the marginal distribution
∫
dx(i)p(x).
The minimizer of this is just qi = pi ∀i, i.e., each qi
is set to the associated marginal distribution of p. So in
particular, when our target distribution is the canonical
ensemble distribution pβU , the optimal q according to pq
distance is the set of marginals of pβU . Note that unlike
the solution for qp distance, here the solution for each
qi is independent of the q(i). So we don’t have a game
theory scenario; we do not need to pay attention to the
q(i) when estimating each separate qi. Correspondingly,
whereas there are many local minima of the team game
Lagrangian studied above, q ∈ Q → KL(q || pβU ), there
is only one, global minimum of q ∈ Q → KL(pβ || q).
Another difference between the two kinds of KL dis-
tance is how the associated optimal product distributions
are typically calculated numerically. The product distri-
bution that optimizes the maxent Lagrangian is usually
found via derivative-based traversal of that Lagrangian,
or techniques like (mixed) Brouwer updating[20, 21, 22,
23, 36]. In contrast, the integral giving each marginal dis-
tribution of p is usually found via adaptive importance
sampling of the associated integral, with the proposal
distribution for the integral to approximate pi set adap-
tively, as q(i)[20].
It is possible to motivate yet other choices for the q
that best approximates pβU . To derive one of them, start
with Lemma 1, with Rn set to the space of real-valued
functions over the set of x’s (so that n is the number of
possible x). Have a single constraint f that restricts us to
P , the unit simplex in Rn, i.e., that restricts us to the set
of functions that (assuming they are nowhere-negative)
are probability distributions. Choose V to be the associ-
ated Lagrangian, L(p) = βEp(G)−S(p), p being a point
in our constrained submanifold of Rn. Note that this p
can be any distribution over the x’s, including one that
couples the components {xi}.
Say we are at some current product distribution q.
Then we can apply Lemma 1 with the choices just out-
lined to tell us what direction to move from q in P so
as to reduce the Lagrangian. In general, taking a step
in that direction will result in a distribution p′ that is
not a product distribution. However we can solve for the
product distribution that is closest to that p′, and move
to that product distribution. By iterating this procedure
we can define a search over the submanifold of product
distributions. We can then solve for the product distri-
bution at which this search will terminate.
To do this, of course, we must define what we mean by
“closest”. Say that we choose to measure closeness by pq
distance. Then the terminating production distribution
is the one for which the marginals of ∇L+λ∇f all equal
0. For each i, this means that
∫
dx(i)[βG(x) + ln(p(x)) + 1 + λ] = 0
at the equilibrium product distribution p. Writing out
p =
∏
i qi and evaluating gives
qi(xi) ∝ exp (−β
∫
dx(i)G(x)∫
dx(i)1
). (10)
This is akin to the qg of a bounded rational game, except
that each player/particle i sets its distribution by evalu-
ating conditional expected U with a uniform distribution
over the x(i), rather than with q(i).
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D. Semi-coordinate transformations
Let’s say there are numerical difficulties with our find-
ing a q that is local minimization of the maxent La-
grangian. That q might still be a poor fit to p(x) if it
is far from the global minimizer of the Lagrangian. Fur-
thermore, even the global minimizer might be a poor fit,
if p(x) simply can’t be well-approximated by a product
distribution.
There are many techniques for improving the fit of a
product distribution to a target distribution in machine
learning and statistics [27]. To give a simple example,
say one wishes to approximate the target distribution in
R
N with a product of Gaussians, one Gaussian for each
coordinate. Even if the target distribution a Gaussian, if
it is askew, then one won’t be able to do a good job of
approximating it with a product of Gaussians. However
one can use Principal Components Analysis (PCA) to
find how to rotate one’s coordinates so that a product of
Gaussians fits the target exactly.
Similar techniques can address both the issue of break-
ing free of local minima of the Lagrangian, and improving
the accuracy of the best product distribution approxima-
tion to p. More precisely, identify x with the variables z
discussed in Sec. IIK. Then consider changing the map
ζ(.) : x → z from the identity map. This will in general
change the mapping from Px to Lz(ζ(Px)). So if Lz is
the Lagrangian we are interested in, the mapping from
product distributions over x can be changed by changing
ζ(.), in general.
As an example, consider the case where the space of x’s
is identical to the space of z’s, and consider all possible
bijective transformations ζ(.). Entropy is the same in
both spaces for any ζ, i.e., S(Pz) = S(ζ(Px)) = S(Px).
So for fixed Px, the entropy in z-space is independent of
ζ(.). However if we fix Px and change ζ(.) the expected
values of utilities will change. So Lz(ζ(Px)) does depend
on ζ(.), as claimed.
This means that by changing ζ(.) while leaving qx un-
changed, we will in general change whether we are at a
local minimum of Lz(ζ(qx)). Furthermore, such a change
will change how closely the global minimizer of Lz(ζ(qx))
approximates any particular target distribution. Indeed,
some such transformation will always transform a team
game to have a strictly convex maxent Lagrangian, with
only one (bounded rational) equilibrium, an equilibrium
that is in the interior of the region of allowed q and
that has the lowest possible value of the Lagrangian.
In the worst case, we can get this behavior by trans-
forming to the semi-coordinate system in which x is one-
dimensional, so that any p(z) — coupling its variables or
not — can be expressed as a q(x) = q1(x1).
Note that unlike with PCA, semi-coordinate transfor-
mations can be used for non-Euclidean semi-coordinates
(i.e., when neither x’s nor z’s are Euclidean vectors).
They also can be guided by numerous measures of the
goodness of fit to the target distribution (e.g., KL dis-
tance), in contrast to PCA’s restriction to assuming a
Gaussian likelihood.
E. Bounded rational game theory for variable
number of players
The bridge between statistical physics and bounded ra-
tional game theory have many uses beyond the practical
ones alluded to the previous subsection. In particular,
it suggests extending bounded rational game theory to
ensembles other than the canonical ensemble. As an ex-
ample, in the GCE the number of particles of the various
allowed types is uncertain and can vary. The bounded
rational game theory version of that ensemble is a game
in which the number of players of various types can vary.
We can illustrate this by extending a simple instance
of evolutionary game theory [6] to incorporate bounded
rationality and allow for a finite total number of play-
ers. Say we have a finite population of players, each of
which has one of m′ possible types. (These are some-
times called feature vectors in the literature.) Each
player i in the population is randomly paired with a dif-
ferent player j, and they each choose a strategy for a two-
person game. The set of strategies each of those players
can choose among is fixed by its respective attribute vec-
tor. In addition the cost player i receives depends on the
attribute vectors of itself and of j, in addition to their
joint strategy. Finally, to reflect this dependence, we al-
low each player to vary its strategy depending on the
attribute vector of its opponent; we call player i’smeta-
strategy the mapping from its opponent’s attribute vec-
tor to i’s strategy. [53].
We encode an instance of this scenario in an x with
a countably infinite number of dimensions. xi,0 ≡ ni(x)
specifies the number of players of type i, with ~n(x) be-
ing the vector of the number of players of all types. For
1 < j ≤ xi,0, xi,j ≡ si,j(x) the meta-strategy selected
by the j’th player of type i. If its opponent is the j’th
player of type T ′, the cost to the i’th player of type T
is gT,i,T ′,j(x) ≡ gT,i,T ′,j(s, s
′, nT , nT ′), where s and s
′
are the two players’ respective meta-strategy. To enforce
consistency between the index numbers i, j and the asso-
ciated numbers of players, we set gT,i,T ′,j(s, s
′, ~n) = 0 if
either i > nT or j > nT ′ .
To start we parallel the GCE, and presume that for
each type we know the expected number of players hav-
ing that type, and the expected cost averaged over all
players having that type. Also stipulate that the distri-
bution over x is a product distribution, q. Then our prior
information specifies the values of∑
k>0 k qT,0(k) =
∑
x
T,0
x
T,0
q
T,0
(x
T,0
)
and
∑
~n:n
T
>0 q(~n)
∑
T ′:n
T ′
>0
[ nT ′∑
T ′′ nT ′′
]
∑
j,k
∫
ds
T
ds
T ′
[1− δ
T,T ′
δ
j,k
]
q
T,j
(s
T
)q
T ′,k
(s
T ′
)g
T,j,T ′,k
(s
T
, s
T ′
, ~n)
n
T
n
T ′
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=
∑
x
1,0
. . .
∑
x
T,0>0
. . .
∑
x
m′,0
∑
T ′
∑
j,k
∫
dx
T,j
dx
T ′,k
{[1− δ
T,T ′
δ
j,k
] [
m′∏
i=1
qi,0(xi,0)] ×
q
T,j
(x
T,j
) q
T ′,k
(x
T ′,k
) g
T,j,T ′,k
(x)
x
T,0
∑
T ′′ xT ′′,0
}
respectively, for all types T . (The sums over j and k all
implicitly extend from 1 to ∞, and the delta functions
are Kronecker deltas that prevent a player from playing
itself.)
We can write these expressions as expectation values,
over x, of 2m′ functions. These functions are the m′
functions nT (x) = xT,0 (one function for each T ) and
the m′ functions
cT (x) ≡
∑
T ′,j,k{[1− δT,T ′ δj,k ] gT,j,T ′,k(x)}
x
T,0
∑
T ′′ xT ′′,0
Θ(x
T,0
)
respectively, where Θ is the Heaviside theta function that
equals 1 if its argument exceeds 0, and equals 0 otherwise.
Accordingly, the maxent principle directs us to minimize
the Lagrangian
L(q) = −
∑
T
[µT (E(nT )−NT )+βT (E(cT )−CT )] − S(q)
where the integers {NT} and real numbers {CT } are our
prior information. In the usual way, the solution for each
pair (i ∈ {1, . . . ,m′}, j ≥ 0) is
q
i,j
(x
i,j
) ∝ e−E([
∑
T ′ µT ′
n
T ′
− β
T ′
c
T ′
] | x
i,j
),
where the values of the Lagrange parameters are all set
by our prior information.
This distribution is analogous to the one in the GCE.
As usual, one can consider variants of it by focusing on
one variable at a time, having prior knowledge in the
form of rationality values, etc. In addition, even if we
stay in this random-2-player games scenario, there is no
reason for us to restrict attention to prior information
paralleling that of the GCE. As with bounded rational
game theory with a fixed number of players, our prior
information can concern nonlinear functions of q, couple
the cost functions, etc.
In particular, in evolutionary game theory we do not
know the expected number of players having each type,
nor their average costs. In addition, the equilibrium con-
cept stipulates that all players will have type T if a par-
ticular condition holds. That condition is that the addi-
tion of a player of type other than T to the population
results in an expected cost to that added player that is
greater than the associated expected cost to the players
having type T . This provides a model of the phenotypic
interactions underlying natural selection.
We can encapsulate evolutionary game theory in a La-
grangian by appropriately replacing each pair of GCE-
type constraints (one pair for each type) with a single
constraint. As an example, we could have the (single)
constraint for type T be that
E(
n
T∑
T ′
n
T ′
) = E([
max
T ′
c
T ′
− c
T
max
T ′
(c
T ′
)−min
T ′
(c
T ′
)
]
γ
) (11)
for some positive real value γ. For finite γ, the entropy
term in the Lagrangian ensures that for no T is the expec-
tation value in the lefthand side of this constraint exactly
0.
In the limit of infinite γ, the distribution minimizing
this Lagrangian is non-infinitesimal only for the evolu-
tionarily stable strategies of conventional evolution-
ary game theory. These are the (type, strategy) pairs
that are best performing, in the sense that no other pair
has a lower cost function value. The distribution for fi-
nite γ can be viewed as a “bounded rational” extension
of conventional evolutionary game theory. In that exten-
sion (type, strategy) pairs are allowed even if they don’t
have the lowest possible cost, so long as their cost is close
to the lowest possible [54].
There is always a solution to this Lagrangian (un-
like the case in conventional full rationality evolutionary
game theory). The technique of Lagrange parameters
provides that solution for each pair (i ∈ {1, . . . ,m′}, j ≥
0) in the usual way:
q
i,j
(x
i,j
) ∝ e
−E(
∑
T ′
α
T ′
f
T ′
(x) | x
i,j
)
where the Lagrange parameters enforce our constraint,
and
f
T ′
(x) ≡
n
T ′∑
T ′′
n
T ′′
− [
max
T ′′
c
T ′′
− c
T ′′
max
T ′′
(c
T ′′
)−min
T ′′
(c
T ′′
)
]
γ
.
More general forms of evolutionary game theory al-
low games with more than two players, and localization
via network structures delineating how players are likely
to be grouped to play a game. Other elaborations have
each player not know the exact attribute vectors of all its
opponents, but only an “information structure” provid-
ing some information about those opponents’ attribute
vectors. All such extensions can be straightforwardly in-
corporated into the current analysis. Many other exten-
sions are simple to make as well. For example, since the
cost functions have all components of ~n in their argument
lists, they can depend on the total size of the population.
This allows us to model the effect on population size of
finite environmental resources.
Note that if we change how we encode the number of
players of the various types and their joint meta-strategy
in x, we change the form of the expectations in Eq. 11.
This reflects the fact that by changing the encoding we
change the implication of using a product distribution.
Formally, such a change in the encoding is a change in
the semi-coordinate system. See Sec. IIK.
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IV. APPENDIX
This appendix provides proofs absent from the main
text.
A. β
∑
i
[Ep(gi)]
2 − S(p) is convex over the unit
simplex
Proof: Since S(p) is concave over the unit simplex,
and the unit simplex is a hyperplane, it suffices to prove
that
∑
i[Ep(gi)]
2 is convex over all of Euclidean space.
Since a weighted average of convex functions is convex,
we only need to prove that any single function of the form
[
∫
dx p(x)f(x)]2 is convex. The Hessian of this function
is 2f(x)f(x′). Rotate coordinates so that f is a basis
vector, i.e., so that f is proportional to a delta function.
This doesn’t change the eigenvalues of the Hessian. After
this change though, the Hessian is diagonal, with one
non-zero entry on the diagonal, which is non-negative.
So its eigenvalues are zero and a non-negative number.
QED.
B. RKL is a rationality operator
Proof: Since KL distance only equals 0 when its ar-
guments match and is never negative, requirement (1)
of rationality operators holds for RKL. Next, since
RKL = argminβ [β
∫
dy p(y)U(y) + ln(N(βU))], we know
that Ep(U) = −
1
N(βU)
∂N(βU)
∂β
|β=RKL(U,p). Accordingly,
all p with the same rationality have the same expected
value Ep(U). Using the technique of Lagrange parame-
ters then readily establishes that of those distributions
having the same expected U , the one with maximal en-
tropy is a Boltzmann distribution. Furthermore, by re-
quirement (1), we know that for a Boltzmann distribu-
tion the exponent β must equal the rationality of that
distribution. QED.
C. Alternative form of a constraint on RKL
Proof: Let f{α, v} be any function that is monotoni-
cally decreasing in its (real-valued) first argument. Then
any constraintR([gi]i,q, qi)−ρi = 0 is satisfied iff the con-
straint f{R([gi]i,q, qi), q(i)} − f{ρi, q(i)} = 0 is satisfied.
Choose
f{α, q(i)} = −
∂ln(N(β[gi]i,q))
∂β
|β=α
=
∫
dxi[gi]i,qe
−α[gi]i,q(xi)
N(α[gi]i,q)
.
Differentiating this quantity with respect to α gives the
negative of the variance of [gi]i,q under the Boltzmann
distribution e
−α[gi]i,q
N(α[gi]i,q)
. Since variances are non-negative,
this derivative is non-positive, which establishes that f
is monotonically decreasing in its first argument.
Evaluating,
f{ρi, q(i)} =
∫
dx gi(x)
e−ρiE(gi|xi)
N(ρigi)
q(i)(x(i)).
In addition, from the equation defining RKL, we know
that
−
ln(N(βU(xi)))
∂β
|β=RKL(U,qi) =
∫
dxiqi(xi)U(xi)
for any function U . Plugging in U = [gi]i,q, we see that
f{R([gi]i,q, qi), q(i)) =
∫
dxiqi(xi)[gi]i,q(xi)
= Eq(gi).QED.
D. qg minimizes the Lagrangians of Eq. 7
Proof: Following Nash, we can use Brouwer’s fixed
point theorem to establish that for any non-negative {ρi},
there must exist at least one product distribution given
by qg. The constraint term in all the Li of Eq. 7 is
zero for this distribution. By requirement (2), we also
know that given qg(i) (and therefore [gi]i,qg ), there is no
qi with rationality ρi that has lower entropy than q
g
i .
Accordingly, no qi will have a lower value of Li. Since
this holds for all i, qg minimizes all the Lagrangians in
Eq. 7 simultaneously. QED.
E. Derivation of Lemma 1
Proof: Consider the set of ~u such that the directional
derivatives D~ufi evaluated at x
′ all equal 0. These are
the directions consistent with our constraints to first or-
der. We need to find the one of those ~u such that D~ug
evaluated at x′ is maximal.
To simplify the analysis we introduce the constraint
that |~u| = 1. This means that the directional derivative
D~uV for any function V is just ~u · ∇V . We then use La-
grange parameters to solve our problem. Our constraints
on ~u are
∑
j u
2
j = 1 and D~ufi(x
′) = ~u · ∇fi(x
′) = 0 ∀i.
Our objective function is D~uV (x
′) = ~u · ∇V (x′).
Differentiating the Lagrangian gives
2λ0ui +
∑
i
λi∇f = ∇V ∀i.
with solution
ui =
∇V −
∑
i λi∇f
2λ0
.
λ0 enforces our constraint on |~u|. Since we are only in-
terested in specifying ~u up to a proportionality constant,
we can set 2λ0 = 1. Redefining the Lagrange parameters
by multiplying them by −1 then gives the result claimed.
QED.
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F. Proof of claims following Lemma 1
i) Define fi(q) ≡
∫
dxiqi(xi), i.e., fi is the constraint
forcing qi to be normalized. Now for any q that equals
zero for some joint move there must be an i and an x′i such
that qi(x
′
i) = 0. Plugging into Lemma 1, we can evaluate
the component of the direction of steepest descent along
the direction of player i’s probability of making move x′i:
∂Li
∂qi(xi)
+ λ
∂fi
∂qi(xi)
=
βE(gi | xi) + ln(qi(xi))−
∫
dx′′i [βE(gi | x
′′
i ) + ln(qi(x
′′
i ))]∫
dx′′i 1
Since there must some x′′i such tha qi(x
′′
i ) 6= 0, ∃xi such
that βE(gi | x
′′
i ) + ln(qi(x
′′
i )) is finite. Therefore our
component is negative infinite. So Li can be reduced by
increasing qi(x
′
i). Accordingly, no q having zero prob-
ability for some joint move x can be a minimum of i’s
Lagrangian.
ii) To construct a bounded rational game with multiple
equilibria, note that at any (necessarily interior) local
minimum q, for each i,
βE(gi | xi) + ln(qi(xi)) =
β
∫
dx(i)gi(xi, x(i))
∏
j 6=i
qj(xj) + ln(qi(xi))
must be independent of xi, by Lemma 1. So say
there is a component-by-component bijection T (x) ≡
(T1(x1), T2(x2), . . .) that leaves all the {gj} unchanged,
i.e., such that gj(x) = gj(T (x)) ∀x, j [55].
Define q′ by q′(x) = q(T (x)) ∀x. Then for any two
values x1i and x
2
i ,
βEq′ (gi | x
1
i ) + ln(q
′
i(x
1
i ))
− βEq′ (gi | x
2
i ) + ln(q
′
i(x
2
i ))
=
β
∫
dx(i)gi(x
1
i , x(i))
∏
j 6=i
qj(T (xj)) + ln(qi(T (x
1
i )))
− β
∫
dx(i)gi(x
2
i , x(i))
∏
j 6=i
qj(T (xj))) + ln(qi(T (x
2
i )))
=
β
∫
dx(i)gi(x
1
i , T
−1(x(i)))
∏
j 6=i
qj(xj) + ln(qi(T (x
1
i )))
− β
∫
dx(i)gi(x
2
i , T
−1(x(i)))
∏
j 6=i
qj(xj)) + ln(qi(T (x
2
i )))
=
β
∫
dx(i)gi(T (x
1
i ), x(i)))
∏
j 6=i
qj(xj) + ln(qi(T (x
1
i )))
− β
∫
dx(i)gi(T (x
2
i ), x(i)))
∏
j 6=i
qj(xj)) + ln(qi(T (x
2
i )))
=
βEq(gi | T (x
1
i )) + ln(qi(T (x
1
i )))
− βEq(gi | T (x
2
i )) + ln(qi(T (x
2
i )))
where the invariance of gi was used in the penultimate
step. Since q is a local minimum though, this last differ-
ence must equal 0. Therefore q′ is also a local minimum.
Now choose the game so that ∀i, xi, T (xi) 6= xi. (Our
congestion game example has this property.) Then the
only way the transformation q → q(T ) can avoiding
producing a new product distribution is if qi(xi) =
qi(x
′
i) ∀i, xi, x
′
i, i.e., q is uniform. Say the Hessians of
the players’ Lagrangians are not all positive definite at
the uniform q. (For example have our congestion game
be biased away from uniform multiplicities.) Then that
q is not a local minimum of the Lagrangians. Therefore
at a local minimum, q 6= q(T ). Accordingly, q and q(T )
are two distinct equilibria.
iii) To establish that at any q there is always a direction
along which any player’s Lagrangian is locally convex, fix
all but two of the {qi}, q0 and q1, and fix both q0 and q1
for all but two of their respective possible values, which
we can write as q0(0), q0(1), q1(0), and q1(1), respectively.
So we can parameterize the set of q we’re considering by
two real numbers, x ≡ q0(0) and y ≡ q1(0). The 2 × 2
Hessian of Li as a function of x and y has the entries
1
x
+
1
a− x
α
α
1
y
+
1
b− y
where a ≡ 1−q0(0)−q0(1) and b ≡ 1−q1(0)−q1(1), and
α is a function of gi and
∏
j 6=0,1 qj . Defining s ≡
1
x
+ 1
a−x
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and t ≡ 1
y
+ 1
b−y , the eigenvalues of that Hessian are
s+ t±
√
4α2 + (s− t)2
2
.
The eigenvalue for the positive root is necessarily posi-
tive. Therefore along the corresponding eigenvector, Li
is convex at q. QED.
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